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ABSTRACT. Although McMahon offers a potentially
valuable extension of Joseph Raz’s conceptualization of
authority by distinguishing three different kinds of
authority, this paper argues, first, that his account of the
conditions and considerations that would justify man-
agerial authority is problematic because it relies on a
conception of reasons for action that excludes precisely
the kind of rationality that plays an important role in
the explanation and justification of authority in
economic organization. This paper explains, second, why
McMahon’s thesis of the justificatory similarity of
authority in governments and nongovernmental organi-
zations can also be seen to hold for corporate governance
of publicly owned firms more specifically. Finally, this
paper raises some critical objections against McMahon’s
presumption of democratic governance in governments
and NGO’s alike. The thrust of these objections is that
democratic corporate governance does not make sense in
the publicly owned firms because: (1) it will not produce
results that are fair or welfare maximizing, and (2) it will
undermine the legitimacy of managerial authority in such
firms.
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authority, managerial democracy, economic theory of the
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Introduction
It remains a mystery to me why Christopher
McMahon’s Authority and Democracy; A General
Theory of Government and Management (1994), as well
as the subsequent article (1995) in Philosophy and
Public Affairs addressing similar issues, have hardly
had any impact on organizational scholarship and
business ethics. In my view, this remarkable fact says
more about the development of these two fields, and
how they relate to other disciplines, such as political
theory for example, than that it tells us anything
significant about the important ideas that these two
publications examine. Given that the occasion for
which this paper is written involves a ten year ret-
rospective examination of the book, I will not say
anything about the article, even though I believe
that all that I say here applies equally to all that is said
there. And since there is really not much to say
about the reception of the book and how it has
impacted organizational theory and business ethics, I
will concentrate, instead, on an assessment and cri-
tique of what I believe to be the main contribution
of the book, hoping, meanwhile, that this will spark-
off a long overdue debate on the book’s significant
contribution. I also aim to make clear why this book
is a landmark achievement in business ethics and
organizational scholarship in spite of it largely being
ignored in these fields and in light of my disagree-
ment with much of what is argued in the book.
A threefold contribution
There is a lot that is valuable and important in
McMahon’s well-argued and provocative book. Yet
in my view the main contribution of the book con-
sists of one conceptual proposal and two substantive
theses pertaining to the application of this conceptual
proposal to human organization in general. The
conceptual proposal involves both a refinement of,
and extension upon Joseph Raz’s currently authori-
tative conceptualization of authority (1975, 1986,
1989, 1990). The refinement consists of making a
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distinction between three different kinds of authority
within the broad confines of the Razian model. This
refinement also comes down to an extension upon
this framework, because not all of what is and can be
said about these three kinds of authority can be traced
back to it. McMahon uses the distinction between the
three kinds of authority to argue two separate, yet
related theses. Contrary to what appears to be com-
monly accepted, the first thesis holds that authority in
both governments and nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) – including modern business corpo-
rations (henceforth: firms) – is justified by similar
rather than different conditions and considerations.
The second thesis holds that the conjunction of this
justificatory similarity and the pursuit of the values of
fairness and welfare maximization, create a normative
presumption that authority in both governments and
NGOs ought to be exercised democratically by those
subject to it. Before I evaluate these theses, I must first
elaborate on McMahon’s discussion of authority.
Three kinds of authority
Joseph Raz (1975, 1986, 1989, 1990) has developed
what is arguably at present the received conception
of authority. He understands authority in terms of
different kinds of practical reasons for action. First-
order reasons for action are the common or garden
variety of reasons we report to have in everyday life.
They either count in favor or against undertaking
certain actions. Second-order reasons for action, by
contrast, are reasons that bear upon our first-order
reasons for action, and that serve to preempt certain
ordinary first-order reasons for action from being
acted upon. Thus a promise of fidelity is an example
of a second-order reason for action that aims to
preempt the first-order reasons we may have to
commit adultery from being acted upon. Things are
roughly the same for authority. According to Raz,
authoritative commands are best seen as second-
order content-independent reasons for action that
serve to preempt certain first-order reasons for action
from being translated into action. When a professor
says: ‘‘Please finish your exam now,’’ he gives us a
reason to stop working on our exam that serves to
preempt most of the ordinary reasons we may have
to continue our work. And although a command
would not preempt all the reasons that count in favor
of continuing to work on the exam there might be,
the sole fact that one has not finished the exam is
arguably not a reason that would fall outside this
command’s domain of preemption.
Contrary to what one might think, there are often
good reasons to let certain (first-order) reasons we
have on the balance of reasons be replaced by (second-
order) authoritative determinations. We let financial
experts decide on adjustments of our investment
portfolio, for example, because they will often do
significantly better overall than we do in making
investment decisions, and hence we should not be
trying to selectively improve on their performance
(Raz, 1986). And we accept the determinations of a
referee in a football game, even if he makes a wrong
decision, because arguing continuously about who did
what and when would in all likelihood keep us from
playing football to begin with.
In the Razian framework, legitimate or de jure
authority is paradigmatic for all other forms of
authority, including de facto authority. This is
because de facto authorities can only function as
authorities (rather than as mere bullies) by claiming
to be de jure authorities. According to Raz, authority
is normally justified if, and only if, it helps those who
accept its determinations better to comply with
reasons that apply to them, than if they were to try to
asses and follow these reasons directly themselves
(Raz, 1986, p. 53). Since the whole idea behind de
jure authority is to serve those under authority, this
account has been coined the ‘‘service conception’’ of
authority (Raz, 1986). McMahon both refines and
builds upon this service conception by distinguishing
three different kinds of authority by the different sets
of conditions and considerations that would justify
them.
The first kind of authority distinguished by
McMahon is the authority of experts or E-authority.
It is already quite clear from the example above that
we often have good reasons to follow the judgment
of experts rather than to assess what we should do or
believe on the balance of reasons ourselves. What is
particularly interesting about McMahon’s account of
E-authority is that it can be both theoretical –
involving reasons for belief – and practical –
involving reasons for action (pp. 85–94). Hence
there can be justified moral E-authorities, for exam-
ple, because it is both possible and plausible that
some of us will prove better guides to the moral
choices we are confronted with than others.
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The second kind of authority that McMahon
distinguishes is P-authority, or the authority that
comes into existence when one person promises to
obey another person or organization. P-authority is
arguably the most familiar kind of practical author-
ity. In business and organizational life, we often
promise to obey other people, either because we
contract to do so directly and explicitly, or because
we enter into an organizational structure consisting
of different roles and responsibilities that come with
different sets of rights and authorities. The essence of
P-authority, then, is that it is justified by a promise
to obey. Hence P-authority transcends the confines
of the service conception, because it is not neces-
sarily true that people promise to do only what they
would have good reason to do. In fact, we often find
ourselves making promises that turn out to be in
conflict with what we believe we should do or
refrain from doing later on.
The third kind of authority distinguished by
McMahon is authority that facilitates mutually
beneficial cooperation or C-authority. C-authority is
justified if, and only if, its directives make those
subject to it better comply with reasons that apply to
them than if no directives would have been given.
C-authority is therefore paradigmatic for the service
conception. On the basis of a basic game theoretical
analysis McMahon explains how – in general –
authority can facilitate mutually beneficial coopera-
tion. The gist of this account is that authorities can
help to overcome assurance problems that burden
many cooperative schemes. More specifically,
authority can both support cooperation by making
salient cooperative solutions to so-called coordina-
tion problems, and by assuring compliance in coop-
erative contexts troubled by problems of motivation
as in the well-known prisoners dilemma (Green,
1988; van Oosterhout, 2002).
A Hobbesian view of authority in human organization
Precisely because these different kinds of authority
depend on differential sets of conditions and con-
siderations that would justify them, McMahon is
able to say something about their respective
strengths, and hence also about their applicability to
different forms of human organization. McMahon
understands the strength of authority in terms of its
‘‘robustness’’ and ‘‘reach’’ (pp. 102–123). Robust-
ness is understood in terms of the scope of (different)
situations in which an authority would give those
under authority sufficient preemptive reasons for
action. Reach is conceived by McMahon in terms of
the fraction of agents for which an authority would
give sufficient preemptive reasons for action given
each situation.
McMahon argues that C-authority is typically
much stronger than either E-authority or P-
authority because most of what we humans value
requires human cooperation, whilst human coop-
eration often is neither spontaneous nor optimal as a
matter of fact (McMahon, 1994, pp. 102–123). Since
the need for human cooperation is typically more
encompassing and crucial than either the need for
expertise or the value of making good on ones
promises, C-authority will typically be more robust
and have a larger reach than either E-authority or
P-authority. Of course, the relative strength of C-
authority is also the result of the relative weakness
of both E-authority and P-authority. E-authority is
relatively weak, on the one hand, because it is fragile
in the face of an accessible external criterion – e.g.
empirical evidence – by which the authority’s per-
formance can be judged, because this opens up the
possibility of anyone under authority to successfully
second-guess the authority in individual cases.
Practical E-authority is no exception to this, and
typically suffers from an additional weakness, as
people often fail to agree about who are authorities
or what is authoritative to begin with (McMahon,
1994, pp. 95–96). P-authority is relatively weak, on
the other hand, because it is unlikely that a promise
will preempt all reasons there may be on the balance
of reasons of those who have promised obedience
(McMahon, 1994, pp. 96–102). Thus even when we
agree that a promise constitutes a reason for action,1
the fact that one can promise just about everything
limits the reason-giving-force of promising as such,
and the preemptive status of promises in particular
(Raz, 1986, pp. 80–94).
Since in practice C-authority will typically be
much stronger than either E-authority or P-
authority, and precisely because C-authority is
justified by facilitating mutually beneficial human
cooperation, it will typically prevail over the two
other forms of authority in organizations. That is,
C-authority will often be legitimate where both
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E-authority and P-authority fail to be. Thus even
whilst the legitimacy of authority in NGOs
appears prima facie to depend on a promise to obey
to the managers in charge of these NGOs – with
the authority of these managers in turn depending
on a promise to obey either the board of that
NGO or some (authoritative) goal that the NGO
is to serve – P-authority in NGOs will typically be
weaker than when the same authority is under-
stood in terms of C-authority facilitating mutually
beneficial cooperation between those under
authority. Something similar holds true for the
relationship between E-authority and C-authority
in organizations, as reliance on expertise can be
seen as just one of many ways to advance human
cooperation.2
That C-authority will prevail over E-authority
and P-authority is not just the case in political life,
however, where Hobbesian arguments, i.e. argu-
ments appealing to conditions and considerations
that would justify C-authority, have traditionally
been important in the justification of authority of the
state (Green, 1988).3 According to McMahon, it is
also true for authority in NGOs, and hence for
authority within human organization in general.
McMahon believes that this change in the way of
thinking about the justification of authority in NGO
parallels the shift from the ‘droit divine’ model to the
social contract justification of political authority of
the state that took place in 17th-century England
(McMahon, 1994, pp. 289–292). And indeed, the
thesis that the legitimacy of authority in all human
organizations ultimately depends on similar rather
than different conditions and considerations repre-
sents a radical break with how we tend to conceive
authority in governments and NGOs in everyday
life.
The presumption of democratic governance
Both McMahon’s distinction between three differ-
ent kinds of authority and his thesis that authority in
all forms of human organizational reality ultimately
depends on a similar justificatory logic, shed an
important light on what constitutes legitimate
authority in governance. Yet, even legitimate
authority in governance can be exercised in different
ways. On the one hand, it could be exercised
autocratically by – what would then be – a benev-
olent dictator. On the other hand, it could be
exercised democratically by those under authority.
The latter is also how McMahon understands
democracy. In his view democracy is ‘‘reflexive
authority,’’ that is, ‘‘the collective exercise of
authority by those subject to it’’ (McMahon, 1994,
p. xii).
McMahon argues that the pursuit of the values
fairness and welfare maximization create a pre-
sumption that authority in organizations ought to be
exercised democratically. This is because the dem-
ocratic principle of ‘one man, one vote’ establishes
‘‘that each will get what he deems best about equally
often,’’ which is what best promotes the value of
fairness, whilst simultaneously ensuring that what is
authoritatively decided ‘‘is deemed best by more
people than not,’’ which is what the value of welfare
maximization requires (McMahon, 1994, p. 258).
Yet, McMahon argues that the case for democratic
governance is much stronger for governments than it
is for NGOs. This is because the case for democratic
governance of NGOs critically hinges on the con-
straints that higher – typically governmental –
authorities may impose on the goals of NGOs and
the means whereby these goals may be pursued
(McMahon, 1994, p. 265). Yet in spite of the case
for democratic governance of NGOs being weaker
than it is for governments, ‘‘constitutions for non-
governmental organizations that fail to provide the
employees as a whole with some sort of role in
formulation of ultimate managerial policy are
problematic,’’ says McMahon (1994, p. 285).
Authority and democracy in corporate
governance?
My evaluation of this threefold contribution arises
mainly from an attempt to apply the conceptual
proposal and the two theses based on it to the realm
of economic organization and the issue of corporate
governance in particular. Below, I first raise some
reservations about the conception of reasons for
action that seems to underlie McMahon’s analysis of
the considerations and conditions that would justify
C-authority, and hence also about the applicability
of this conception to the economic realm. I will then
consider his thesis that authority in governments and
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NGOs is based on a similar rather than a different
justificatory logic by applying it to the publicly
owned corporation (henceforth: firm). Although I
will find that the thesis of justificatory similarity can
be seen to hold in the context of corporate gover-
nance of publicly owned firms, I also find that the
same reasons that support this thesis force me to
reject the presumption of democratic corporate
governance.
Reasons for action in the economic realm
In explaining how C-authority is justified, McMahon
formulates two principles of rationality. The principle
of individual rationality, first, establishes that a person
has sufficient reason ‘‘to contribute to a cooperative
venture ... if the incremental value ... that will be
created by one’s contribution exceeds the costs to one
of contributing’’ (McMahon, 1994, p. 103). The
principle of collective rationality, second, holds that
‘‘One has reason to contribute to a cooperative
venture ... if its total value to one when one’s con-
tribution is added to those of the others who have
contributed or will contribute exceeds the cost to one
of contributing’’ (p. 104). The question whether one
should contribute therefore appears to come down to
a relatively straightforward cost-benefit analysis.
But things are different than they seem. In order
to establish the costs and benefits of contributing to a
particular cooperative scheme, McMahon argues
that we should calculate the benefits of cooperation
as the difference between the value of the cooper-
ative outcome and the value of non-cooperative
outcome, whilst ignoring the potential benefits of
free-riding (p. 105). According to McMahon, the
reason for the latter is that ‘‘the principle of collec-
tive rationality preempts the principle of individual
rationality’’ because only ‘‘if the requirement that it
articulates excludes and replaces the judgment
deriving from individual rationality will the coop-
erative benefits associated with compliance be
achieved’’ (p. 117). This requirement, however, is
problematic for two reasons.
It is problematic, first, because when developing
an account of justified C-authority, that is, a justi-
fication for letting certain reasons for action that
articulate collective rationality preempt reasons for
action articulating individual rationality, one cannot
revert to simply stipulating that collective rationality
preempts individual rationality, as this is precisely
what needs to be established. What one must argue,
instead, is why it would not be rational to free ride if
one could get away with it without undermining the
cooperative outcome and without getting caught.
McMahon does not do so and thereby fails to give a
satisfactory account of the conditions and consider-
ations that would justify C-authority.
It is problematic, second, because in excluding the
kind of ‘‘opportunistic’’ rationality (Williamson,
1985) that agents display when they defect on each
others irreversible commitment, McMahon exposes
himself to subscribe to a particular conception of
reasons for action, one that has a strong ‘‘externalist’’
and perhaps even moral flavor (Williams, 1981).
McMahon explicitly denies that his understanding of
reasons is a moral one (p. 106), yet he fails to explain
why collective rationality must preempt individual
rationality as seen from the individual in a non-
moral way. In the context of giving an account of
legitimate authority in corporate governance this
will prove highly problematic, because in excluding
this opportunistic rationality from the onset,
McMahon also excludes the very kind economic
rationality that is necessary to explain and justify the
existence of authority and firms within markets.
In my view, McMahon faces something of a
dilemma here. Either he sticks to his ‘generalist’ (or
even moral) account of rationality in which reasons
have equal action guiding force for all in like situa-
tions (McMahon, 1994, p. 105), or he admits the
kind of individualist and opportunistic rationality we
see – or rather assume – in the economic realm (see
Mueller, 2004), and that is necessary both to explain
and to justify the legitimacy of managerial authority
in corporate governance.4 If he chooses the former
option, he will severely limit the scope of organi-
zational reality to which his understanding of C-
authority can be applied, thereby effectively
excluding most extant forms of economic organi-
zation. Yet if he admits the kind of opportunistic
rationality that characterizes homo economicus, he
still owes us an explanation of why collective
rationality should preempt individual rationality in
prisoner’s dilemma-like predicaments, and hence an
account of what would justify C-authority in such
cases. Either way, his account of authority in human
organization loses its intended force.
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Authority in corporate governance
Whether there actually is authority in the firm to
begin with is an issue that has divided economists
and organizational scholars ever since Coase’s (1937)
visionary essay on the nature of the firm. On the one
hand, there are those who believe that the existence
of authority relations is precisely what demarcates
firms from markets (e.g. Barnard, 1968; Cyert and
March, 1963; March and Simon, 1958; Williamson,
1985, 1991). On the other hand, there are those that
deny that there is any authority within firms, and
that all that a firm consists of are ‘‘ordinary market
contracting’’ relations between corporate constitu-
encies (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, pp. 777–778).
The latter view is commonly referred to as the nexus
of contracts approach (e.g. Boatright, 2002; Chueng,
1983; Easterbrook and Fishel, 1989, 1991; Jensen
and Meckling, 1976), and is at present a powerful
paradigm in organizational theory. I will not get into
the issue here whether there is indeed authority in
the firm, as that will not be necessary to evaluate
McMahon’s claim of the justificatory similarity of
authority in governments and firms.5 Instead, I will
review the arguments there are in the literature
concluding that there is authority within firms, and
assess whether these arguments support McMahon’s
thesis of justificatory similarity between firms and
states.
There are quite a few theories and arguments
offering explanations of why there is authority in
firms, and why there are firms within markets. Since
most of these arguments spring from an economic –
or rational choice – methodology (Blaug, 1992;
Ma¨ki, 2001), they typically simultaneously provide a
justification of authority when it is interpreted as
being functional to the ultimate goal of welfare
maximization. Often, however, it is not very clear
whether the argument leading to authority as the
conclusion is a positive or normative one, as such
arguments often leave unexplained how and by what
mechanism authority is produced as a matter of fact
(cf. Dow, 1987). Below, I will briefly discuss the
arguments that would justify authority within firms
in order to assess whether McMahon’s justificatory
similarity thesis holds for corporate governance.
Coase’s original contribution (1937) constitutes
an interesting starting point for our analysis. Coase
was one of the first to notice that there is a cost to
using the price mechanism. These so-called ‘‘trans-
action costs’’ include: the costs of discovering effi-
cient prices; the cost of bargaining; and the costs of
drawing up contracts to support economic ex-
change. According to Coase, these transaction costs
can often to a significant degree be circumvented by
carrying out transactions through the authority of a
coordinator-entrepreneur rather than through the
market. He held that one should continue to com-
plete transactions through the firm until the marginal
cost of doing so equals the marginal cost of carrying
out the transaction through the market (Coase,
1937). In this view, spontaneous coordination of the
market and authoritative coordination within the
firm become substitutes and the choice between
them a matter of comparative efficiency. Focusing
on decision-making within organizations, Kenneth
Arrow (1991) has argued in a somewhat similar vein
that economizing features of communication in
collective decision-making require elite control of
organizations, and provide a justification of the
authority of executive officers within firms.
Both arguments therefore support the conclusion
that there will be justified authority within the firm,
but only in a rather limited sense. Authority in the
firm will be justified for as long as it will be more
efficient for economic parties to be guided by
authoritative directives in conducting their transac-
tions than if each of those actors would carryout these
transactions on their own. In my view, the kind of
authority that can be justified by these considerations
therefore most resembles (practical) E-authority, or
the authority of expertise. E-authority is legitimate
within firms for as long as managers make better
decisions in coordinating transactions within the firm
than those under authority would do spontaneously
by themselves. As a result, it is typically weaker than
the accounts of C-authority in the firm discussed
below, because managers may very well be proven
wrong in individual cases, whilst experiencing diffi-
culties establishing their authority to begin with.6
Arguments that would establish the justification of
C-authority in the firm clearly go beyond the
requirements that would justify the (coordinating)
expertise of managers within firms. These arguments
involve the safeguarding and distributive functions of
authority in economic organization. Oliver William-
son’s transaction costs approach to economic organi-
zation is paradigmatic for the safeguarding role of
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authority in firms. According to Williamson, transac-
tions, which differ in their vulnerability to problems of
defection and expropriation, are discriminatively
aligned with governance structures, which differ in
their costs and protective qualities, in a (mainly)
transaction cost economizing way (Williamson, 1991).
Hence one-shot transactions that take place under
conditions of uncertainty and that require investment
in specific assets, are particularly vulnerable to ex post
hold-up problems, and are hence best carried out
under the unified control of common ownership
rather than through arms length market contracting
(Williamson, 1985).
But it is not just ex post hazards of defection that
arise from parties making specific investments in
their contribution to the firm. There also arises an ex
post distribution problem because the contribution of
any corporate constituency to the corporate venture
will typically require some form of dedicated
investment. The dedication of factors and assets will
generate so-called ‘‘quasi rents’’ once the firm is a
going concern (Zingales, 1998), because it will lead
to a difference between their value being put to use
within the firm, and the highest value that they can
recover outside the firm. The distribution problem
crops up because it is not feasible to negotiate
complete contracts that will exhaustively stipulate
how such quasi rents should be distributed over
corporate constituencies in all possible contingencies
ex ante (Grosman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore,
1990; MacNeil, 1974; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). At
least some of the quasi rents will need to be dis-
tributed ex post, and it is here that the distributive
function of authority in corporate governance be-
comes important. Inspired by Alchian and Demsetz
(1972), Blair and Stout (1999) have elaborated on
this distributive function of authority in corporate
governance. On the basis of an analysis of the
American publicly owned firm, they argue that
directors of such firms can be seen to have the
authority to distribute quasi rents in order to enable
them to secure ongoing mutually beneficial coop-
eration between the constituencies that make up the
firm (see also Bainbridge, 2003). These directors can
only fulfill their function of ‘‘mediating hierarch,’’
however, when they have sufficient authority to
decide on the distribution of quasi rents over the
corporate constituencies that make up the firm (Blair
and Stout, 1999). The authority at stake here is
C-authority, because managers only have this dis-
tributive authority to secure superior cooperative
outcomes.
In contrast to their everyday conception of the
firm as a chain of promissory obligations that begins
with its owners and ends with the firms lowest
ranking employees, the literature on corporate
governance and the theory of the firm does not
provide us with much that could be used to justify
P-authority in the firm. This is first, because in the
eyes of many economists, promises are but ‘‘cheap
talk’’ that has no effect on reward structures and
outcomes (cf. Farell and Rabin, 1996). It is second,
because precisely the problematic nature of promises
has spurred the development of a strong current in
economic organization theory attempting to explain –
or design – those institutions and organizational fea-
tures that turn promises into ‘credible commitments’
(Williamson, 1983). The most significant branch
within this theoretical current is ‘‘agency theory’’
(Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and
Meckling, 1976), which is at present the dominant
theoretical framework in corporate governance theory
and research (Schleifer and Vishny, 1997). In agency
theory, the firm is conceived of a chain of agency
relations – rather than promissory obligations – that
require remedies to avoid inefficient outcomes.
Although there is some confusion between the legal
conception of agency, which takes promissory obli-
gations as given and unproblematic, and its economic
counterpart, which takes precisely the opposite view
(Orts, 1997), it is quite clear that the literature on
corporate governance and the theory of the firm
challenges rather than supports there being justified
P-authority in the firm. This is in line with
McMahon’s view that P-authority is typically weak
and therefore problematic in economic organizations.
But McMahon’s thesis of justificatory similarity
receives even stronger support from another branch
of theorizing on corporate governance and the
theory of the firm. In the so-called property rights
school of thought in economic organization theory
(Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990),
property rights within the firm are not taken as a
given source of promissory obligations, but are ra-
ther endogenously explained in terms of the relative
costs and benefits of contracting and ownership
respectively. Hansmann (1996) has given an acces-
sible and elaborate account of property rights
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assignment in economic organization. Since in his
view property rights in the firm need not be con-
nected to the supply of capital to the firm, they can
be assigned to any ‘‘patron’’ an economic enterprise
interacts and exchanges with on a regular basis
(Hansmann, 1996, p. 15). He argues that ownership
of an ‘‘enterprise’’ is most efficiently assigned to that
corporate constituency that ‘‘minimizes the sum of
all of the costs of a firm’s transactions’’ (1996, p. 22).
Given that we find a great variety of extant ownership
structures in economic organizations in most advanced
economies, there is sufficient reason to believe that
ownership of economic organizations is not an exog-
enously given constant, but rather a variable that is
explained in terms of its economizing virtues in the
cooperative venture of firms. When ownership is
explained in terms of its function of facilitating
mutually beneficial cooperation within the firm, it
loses its given and unproblematic status as a source of
P-authority in economic organization, while simul-
taneously providing a more solid foundation in terms
of the conditions and considerations that would justify
C-authority in the firm. McMahon’s thesis of the
justificatory similarity of governments and NGOs
therefore also holds for economic organization in
general and corporate governance more specifically.
Democratic corporate governance?
Given what we now know about the considerations
and conditions that would justify authority in eco-
nomic organization, the final issue now at stake is the
question whether there is indeed a presumption that
authority in corporate governance ought to be exer-
cised democratically. Remember that McMahon holds
that the pursuit of fairness and welfare maximization
require that (legitimate) authority in NGO be exer-
cised democratically, because the democratic principle
of ‘‘one man, one vote’’ establishes ‘‘that each will get
what he deems best about equally often,’’ whilst
simultaneously ensuring that what is authoritatively
decided ‘‘is deemed best by more people than not’’
(McMahon, 1994, p. 258). Contrary to what is argued
by McMahon, however, I believe there to be two
rather fundamental reasons why democratic corporate
governance does not make much sense.
The first reason is that in the context of corporate
governance, the democratic principle of ‘‘one man,
one vote’’ will not produce the kind of results that
make democratic employee governance desirable
from the perspective of fairness and welfare maxi-
mization. The main problem is that this principle
does not do justice to the different stakes that natural
persons typically have in the corporate venture.
Natural persons will have an interest in the firm only
indirectly through their differential corporate con-
stituency status of shareholder, employee, integrated
supplier or customer. And since these different
interests in the firm will also make these natural
persons have a different ‘stake’ in it, it does not seem
very fair to give them all an equal say in things.
Moreover, it will often be the case that different
natural persons have very different interests – and
hence very different stakes in the firm – even within
the same corporate constituency group. Thus own-
ers may, and typically do have very unequal share-
holdings (La Porta et al., 1999), while older
employees will usually not have the same interests as
younger ones (Hansmann, 1996, pp. 89–119). But it
is not just that democratic corporate governance will
not produce the kind of fairness results that
McMahon envisages. Neither will it be welfare
maximizing, because the equal say that natural per-
sons would then have in spite of their differential
stakes in the firm will often clash with what maxi-
mizes their welfare. The fact that employee gover-
nance is relatively rare, and in practice mostly
restricted to professional services, constitutes prima
facie evidence that it will often not be efficient
enough to weigh up to the considerations that make
it a desirable feature of corporate governance
(Boatright, 2004; Dow, 2004). McMahon (1994,
pp. 10–15) rejects a ‘‘stakeholder’’ perspective on
corporate governance,7 however, and maintains that
the democratic principle of ‘‘one man, one vote’’
only makes sense when applied exclusively to
employees. This brings me to the second reason why
I reject the presumption of democratic corporate
governance.
McMahon restricts democratic (corporate) gover-
nance to employees alone because he does not think
that being affected by the consequences of authorita-
tive determinations is quite the same thing as being
directed by them (McMahon, 1994, pp. 10–15). In
McMahon’s view, only employees are guided by
authoritative directives and hence only employees
can be under authority. And since McMahon under-
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stands democracy as the reflexive exercise of
authority, that is, as authority exercised by those
subject to it (1994, p. 12), only employees can
exercise this authority democratically. I have
explained, however, that the strongest kind of
authority there is within publicly owned firms is
authority that facilitates mutually beneficial coopera-
tion between different corporate constituency groups,
and that in this view managers function as ‘‘mediating
hierarchs’’ in safeguarding dedicated contributions of
corporate constituency groups, on the one hand, and
in ex post distributing the resulting quasi-rents over
these groups, on the other. It is important to note
that in this view it would be highly problematic
when authority is exercised democratically by
employees alone – as proposed by McMahon – be-
cause assigning the (democratic) exercise of authority
exclusively to employees may significantly undermine
the legitimacy of authority in the firm.
This is, first, because employees – as a corporate
constituency group – are in a poor position to fulfill
the coordinative, safeguarding, adjudicative or dis-
tributive functions of authority that jointly provide
for the conditions and considerations that would
justify authority in the firm. Informational economies
(Arrow, 1991) and problems of collective decision-
making (Hansmann, 1996) will make it largely
infeasible for employees to fulfill any significant
coordinating or decision-making function within the
firm, while the fact that employees are but one of the
firm’s constituency groups whose dedicated contri-
butions will need to be safeguarded – and who are
hence also party in the distribution of quasi rents –
speaks against employees having mediating or dis-
tributive role in the firm, even they could overcome
their information processing and decision-making
problems.
Assigning the democratic exercise of authority in
the firm exclusively to employees will undermine
the legitimacy of that authority, second, because the
exercise of authority by employees alone will not do
justice to the fact that natural persons within other
corporate constituency groups are not merely affected
by authoritative determinations, as claimed by
McMahon (pp. 10–15), but also find a significant
part of the reasons for action that they may have as a
result of their specific constituency interest in the
firm preempted by authoritative determinations.
Contrary to McMahon, I believe that it is the
condition of having ones reason for action pre-
empted by authoritative determinations, rather than
the question whether one is guided or merely af-
fected by them, that is the relevant criterion for
deciding whether one is under authority or not. And
because McMahon’s criterion for assessing whether
one is under authority or not is misguided in my
view, he also unnecessarily restricts the democratic
exercise of authority in the firm to its employees
alone, thereby simultaneously undermining the
legitimacy of that authority.8 That shareholders, and
not just employees, are to a significant extent under
managerial authority in publicly owned firms is not
merely an issue of conceptual disagreement between
McMahon and me. The issue finds a real life illustra-
tion in the so-called ‘‘business judgment rule,’’ a case
law concept in Delaware corporate law according to
which Delaware judges have consistently been
unwilling – but for a few exceptions – to review
everyday managerial decisions, even if those decisions
harm the legitimate interests of shareholders.9 Demo-
cratic employee governance in publicly owned firms is
therefore largely in conflict with their being legitimate
authority in the firm, that is, authority that is justified
by facilitating mutually beneficial cooperation be-
tween different corporate constituency groups. And
when the value of democratic corporate governance
becomes chiefly incompatible in this way with there
being legitimate authority in the firm, it is clear that the
value of democratic corporate governance must give
way.
Conclusion
I have argued, first, that McMahon offers a poten-
tially valuable extension on the Razian model of
authority by distinguishing three different kinds of
authority by the different sets of conditions and
considerations that would justify them. I have also
argued, however, that his account of the conditions
and considerations that would justify C-authority is
problematic, because it appears to rely on a con-
ception of reasons for action that excludes precisely
the kind of one-eyed rationality that plays an
important role in the explanation and justification of
authority in the firm.
I have argued, second, that McMahon’s thesis of the
justificatory similarity of authority in firms and NGO
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also holds for corporate governance, because P-
authority hardly plays any role in the justification of
authority in corporate governance of publicly listed
firms, whilst the conditions and considerations that
would justify the much stronger C-authority in the
firm explain why P-authority need not play a role at all
in corporate governance. This thesis hence establishes
a Hobbesian picture of authority in human organi-
zation that applies as much to economic organization
as it applies to governments and other NGOs.
I have argued, finally, that the presumption of
democratic governance neither holds, nor makes
much sense in the corporate governance of publicly
owned firms. It does not make much sense because
corporate democracy will not produce the kind of
results that are desirable from the pursuit of fairness
and welfare maximization. The realization of fairness
is undermined because the principle of ‘‘one man, one
vote’’ will do injustice to the different stakes natural
persons typically have in the cooperative venture of
the firm, whilst the pursuit of welfare maximization is
frustrated because democratic decision-making by
employees alone will often be guided by interests
other than what will maximize welfare. Moreover, the
presumption of democratic governance does not hold
in the context of corporate governance because cor-
porate democracy will largely undermine there being
legitimate authority in the firm.
In spite of my disagreement with an important part
of what is argued by McMahon, I believe his book to
be a landmark achievement nevertheless. It sheds
important light on a conceptual issue in economic
organization theory. While the presence of authority
is seen by many as what demarcates organizations
within markets, it has really never been made very
explicit what precisely authority is been taken to
mean. It also remains important because it demon-
strates how concepts and theories from political the-
ory can be fruitfully applied to the realm of economic
organization. This was already the case the other way
around (cf. Moe, 1984), but McMahon’s work
demonstrates that it is not a one-way relationship. It
thereby more closely connects the fields of political
and economic organization at the conceptual level,
and has made me realize that the bulk of my own
research (e.g. van Oosterhout, 2002, 2005, 2006; van
Oosterhout et al. 2006) is actually in the intersection
of these two fields. Finally, McMahon’s work dem-
onstrates that normative theory in economic and
political organization is far from dead, and that we
can – and should – take a much broader perspective
than what is currently in vogue in organizational
theory and business ethics. That makes it all the more
surprising that McMahon’s two publications have
actually largely been ignored in those fields. I can only
hope that our exchange of ideas here will bring an end
to that.
Notes
1 Both promises and authoritative directives can be
seen as so-called ‘‘content-independent reasons for ac-
tion.’’ See Hart (1982).
2 This raises the question whether E-authority and
C-authority are really different kinds of authority, or
whether E-authority is just a particular kind of
C-authority. I come to the latter conclusion elsewhere
(van Oosterhout, 2006). Although I will not address this
issue in this paper, I do create some confusion when I
characterize ‘‘Coasian’’ managerial authority as
E-authority below. I will come back to this later.
3 Green (1988) elaborates on the authority of the state
in remedying both problems of coordination and prob-
lems of motivation and compliance in prisoner’s
dilemma-like situations. He finds, however, that the
justification of authority is problematic in both contexts.
I have addressed similar problems in my dissertation (see
Van Oosterhout, 2002, chapter 2), and have come to
more or less the same conclusion.
4 Pettit (1995) argues that even though the assumption
of the rationality of homo economicus in mainstream
economic theorizing is evidently inveracious, it can be
retained in economic theorizing when homo economi-
cus is seen as virtually rather than actually governing
human action. In Pettit’s view, homo economicus will
only take ‘‘the driver’s seat’’ in actual human agents un-
der certain conditions, such as when the interests of the
agent in question are served less well than those of sim-
ilar agents in similar situations. In such cases, the agent
is stimulated to change his disposition of rationality and
will move closer to the rationality captured in the ideal
type of homo economicus. Note, however, that Pettit’s
proposal concerns positive – or explanatory – rational
choice theory rather than normative – or justificatory –
rational choice theory. Christiano (2004) observes that
the assumption of homo economicus in economic theo-
rizing ultimately leads to an incompatibility between the
normative and positive ambitions of rational choice
theory, in that actual movements to situations of higher
aggregate welfare identified on the basis of the rational-
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ity of homo economicus may very well be hindered by
the constraints set by exactly the same rationality.
I think McMahon’s position on the preemption of
individual rationality by collective rationality nicely
illustrates the kind of problem Christiano is concerned
with, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to
elaborate on this any further. My point is merely to
demonstrate that assuming reasons for action to be gen-
eral, and having equal guiding force for all in like situa-
tions, offers no substantive solution to the clash
between individual and collective rationality as mani-
fested in prisoner’s dilemma-like situations.
5 I do address that question in van Oosterhout (2006),
however.
6 As I observed above in note 2, one can conceive
E-authority as a subspecies of coordinating C-authority
rather than as a separate kind of authority. In spite of its
coordinative function, I characterize this Coasian kind
of authority as E-authority here because (1) I do not
believe that the kind of managerial authority involved
here merely concerns solving problems of pure coordi-
nation, as it will typically involve some form of exper-
tise, and (2) because the conditions and considerations
that would justify this kind of authority resemble those
that would justify E-authority more than those that
would justify C-authority, even if only because the lat-
ter additionally involves safeguarding and distributive
features (see below). Elsewhere I abandon McMahon’s
classification of the three different kinds of authority
precisely for these reasons and introduce the distinction
between strong and weak authority as an alternative
classificatory scheme (van Oosterhout, 2006).
7 By which I do not mean what is commonly under-
stood in business ethics and organizational theory as
‘‘stakeholder theory’’ (see Donaldson and Preston, 1995;
Freeman, 1984). I merely want to point out that differ-
ent natural persons tied up in the corporate venture
may have very different stakes in the firm. That obser-
vation does not require any further conceptualization of
the notion of stakeholder, nor do I want to import the
specific connotation here that the concept of stake-
holder has received in stakeholder theory.
8 Note that in this view, democratic employee gover-
nance does not even satisfy the conditions of ‘‘reflexive
authority,’’ understood by McMahon as ‘‘the generation
of authoritative directives by those who will be subject
to them’’ (1994, p. 12). This is because shareholders
would be under authority in democratic employee gov-
ernance without having any role in its exercise.
9 As evidenced in: Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984) and Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280
A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
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